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The end of antitrust-
or a new beginning? 
BY JOE SIMS and ROBERT H. LANDE* 
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Antitrust is in one of its periodic states of decline. Historically, it 
has rebounded from these valleys to rise to even higher peaks of 
enthusiastic public and political popularity. The first period of 
substantial antitrust activity began 15 years after the passage of 
the Sherman Act, and lasted into the 1920s. The Great Depres-
sion saw antitrust at its lowest, followed by Thurman Arnold's 
aggressive tenure, but World War II was hardly a period of great 
antitrust enthusiasm. The 1950 Ce1ler-Kefauver amendment to 
section 7 began the golden age of antitrust, a period that lasted 
until the middle 1970s. So far, each rebound has resulted in 
broader and more vigorous antitrust enforcement efforts. 
There is, however, growing evidence that this particular de-
cline may be different-that we may be witnessing a true meta-
morphosis, or perhaps even the demise of antitrust as we know it. 
We are nearing the climactic stage of our prolonged romance with 
economics-and, recently, Chicago school economics-as the 
guiding principle of antitrust. If current trends continue, the 
result could very well be the end of antitrust as it has traditionally 
been conceived. 
Despite the considerable momentum generated, we doubt this 
will happen. Traditional antitrust principles are so firmly en-
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trenched in our American social fabric and psyche that they will 
not disappear, no matter what the logical weight of a particular 
brand of economics. The difficult question is what form antitrust 
will take, and exactly how economic analysis and populist-
oriented notions will eventually combine. To borrow an earlier 
line, antitrust is not dead-it has merely grown up. The interest-
ing uncertainty is how it will age. 
Differing perspectives 
Of course, there are many "antitrusts," depending on whose 
perspective you accept. We know from experience that individual 
perspectives can influence perceptions and actions. Consider the 
case of Ken "the Snake" Stabler, one of the NFL's premier "free 
spirits." A writer once read the former Raider and Saints quarter-
back this passage from adventure writer Jack London: "I would 
rather be ashes than dust. 1 would rather that my spark should 
burn out in a brilliant blaze that it should be stifled by dry rot. 1 
would rather be a superb meteor than a sleepy, permanent 
planet." What message was London trying to convey? "Throw 
deep," said Stabler. 
There are still some Stabler-like perspectives on antitrust; 
some are more interested in the size of the splash than the 
direction of the rock. But these are a very small minority, and 
other perspectives dominate. 
To the scholar, antitrust is an analytical framework for an-
swering legal questions about business conduct. Optimally, it 
would provide predictable answers to common problems and at 
least a basis for reasonable guessing in unusual situations. It is 
the scholars, both economic and legal, who have promoted 
economics as the only (or at least the most attractive) analytical 
infrastructure for antitrust, one clearly preferable to the whims 
and chance of transient political or social policy. They value 
logic, coherence, and long-run predictability. The scholars are at 
the top of the Ferris wheel now, masters of all they see, in charge 
of federal enforcement policy and exercising a growing influence 
on judicial decision making. 
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To the politician, however, economics is only marginally 
relevant.· The politician knows that antitrust has always been a 
powerful rhetorical weapon, useful for raising the bile of those 
voters who are not members of boards of directors (a fairly 
substantial majority of the voting public) and a convenient excuse 
for not approving something that he opposes for some wholly 
unrelated reason. To the politician, whether in Congress, the 
executive branch, or a state attorney general's office, antitrust 
was always-and remains-us against them, the people against 
the corporate behemoths, the populist politician against the 
champions of entrenched greed. To many in this group, antitrust 
is 'even more attractive when it is inactive, since they can criticize 
without having to worry about the consequences of action. To the 
politicians, economic analysis is a tool, to be used or discarded as 
convenient. 
Then there are the internationalists, who see antitrust as an 
archaic doctrine-except when it can be used offensively against 
the hordes from across the sea. The old-style antitrust politicians 
argued-and still do-that the antitrust laws reflect social con-
cerns about fairness, equal opportunity, the virtues of individual 
entrepreneurs, and protection against the unfair use of economic 
and political power. The internationalists say the same thing, but 
their villains are foreign governments and companies, especially 
when subsidized or operating from nonmarket economies. Their 
social concerns are American competitiveness in international 
markets, jobs, trade balances, and protection against the unfair 
use of economic and political power. 
To much of the general public, antitrust is simpler, more 
basic. Antitrust is about fairness, equal opportunity in the 
marketplace, low prices for consumers, and let the best man win. 
This is similar to the politician's perspective, but the politicians 
have frequently misused this rhetoric to protect particular private 
interests-whether it be small grocers, druggists, auto dealers, or 
discounters-even when the interests of those groups were com-
The exceptions will no doubt excuse the overgeneralization. 
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pletely inconsistent with those of the general public. This public 
perception is, however, radically different from that of the 
scholar. While the scholars are concerned about the perverse 
results of government interference with natural market forces, the 
man on the street believes strongly in the process protected by the 
antitrust laws-the system of marketplace competition that is 
the utopian view of antitrust. He believes that, as on the playing 
field, the better team (or company) will win if everyone follows 
the rules and, moreover, that is the way it should be. He believes 
society benefits from the competitive struggle itself, although he 
probably also believes that the struggle needs to be regulated to 
prevent cheating. The man on the street doesn't really mind 
companies growing large until, because they get so big or last so 
long, their continued prominence seems unlikely to be the result 
of mere "skill, foresight and industry," to borrow an old phrase. 
In other words, a hard-fought contest is fine, but people get 
worried when the score gets too lopsided. 
To the body politic, "allocative efficiency" is gibberish, and 
"supply-side substitutability," not much better. Because their 
focus is on both process and results, people are susceptible to the 
populist rhetoric of the politicians, but at the same time are leery 
of putting too many constraints on energetic enterpreneurs. They 
don't like bureaucrats, private or governmental. Economic anal-
ysis is fine, but when used to justify mergers of $10 billion oil 
giants, many think someone has his head screwed on wrong. Free 
markets are fine, until they see conglomerate acquisitions that 
appear to make no sense. They don't like regulation in concept, 
but if it means the airlines won't overbook their planes and bump 
them from a long-planned trip, it's probably desirable in that 
specific instance. They don't mind a little uncertainty or inconsis-
tency because all the precise rules anyone advocates are wrong. 
Finally, they can be persuaded to become more interested in this 
subject when the economy is doing fine than when things are 
going bad. Antitrust is to some extent a luxury product, to be 
enjoyed when possible but set aside when more important things, 
like food on the table, are concerned. 
It's not clear there is a "business community" perspective. 
Many large businesses view the antitrust laws as impediments to 
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efficient operations, particularly in light of the growing threat of 
international competition. But many smaller businesses see anti-
trust as a business civil rights statute, intended to ensure equal 
opportunity and maybe even an egalitarian result. Individual 
businesspeople have about as many differing views on antitrust as 
they do on politics. The so-called "business community" has 
proven over the years to be quite diverse indeed. 
These inconsistent and, indeed, warring perspectives all exist 
today. The scholars-more specifically, those scholars who are 
members of the Chicago school-control the federal enforcement 
agencies and a growing portion of the courts and the law schools. 
Thus, the basic organs of antitrust all trumpet efficiency-oriented 
economic analysis (although even in this happy land there are 
rumblings of discontent, with some arguing that things have gone 
too far and others arguing that we have not gone far enough). 
The politicians survive in the Congress and in state prosecutors' 
offices, proving that there is still an audience for populist rheto-
ric, even if there is not enough political support for aggressive 
action. Economic times aren't quite good enough for the public 
to get too enthusiastic about antitrust, and there is growing 
concern about America's position in international markets. And 
so we sit, in an uneasy truce, with no one perspective in absolute 
control, with economics dominating the rhetoric but the politi-
cians continuing to play a good rubber-band defense-easily 
bending but never breaking. 
The signs of this uneasy truce are all around us. Recent 
years have seen the blurring of the per se and rule-of-reason 
approaches.2 Only hard-core price-fixing really remains per se 
illegal. The merger rules have been loosened in the name of 
economics, but the rationale for change is in major respects 
inconsistent with the remaining rules, and there seems every 
reason to anticipate further change if economic analysis continues 
to control enforcement decisions. Private suits are down, but 
suits by competitors are up and (most surprisingly) occasionally 
2 See Gellhorn & Tatham, Making Sense Out oj the Rule oj 
Reason, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 155 (1985). 
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successful, even after enforcement agency approvals. Vertical 
cases brought by the government have disappeared, but the 
politicians continue to beat on the vertical drum. Some new 
(frequently small) antitrust targets appear-the professions, the 
health industry, and the traditionally exempt-but those efforts 
increasingly arouse spirited political opposition. There are calls 
for further-and more substantial-antitrust reform from the 
scholars and the internationalists, but public support seems shal-
low or nonexistent and the politicians seem able to prevent 
dramatic change. It is like a basketball game played in three-foot-
deep mud-a lot of movement with considerable effort, but so 
far very low scoring. 
The current orthodoxy-not yet universal 
There is no doubt that Chicago school concepts have taken 
control of the federal enforcement agencies, and are increasingly 
influential in the courts. Much, if not all, of this current ortho-
doxy is based on "new"3 views of microeconomics and the belief 
that economic efficiency is the only legitimate goal of antitrust 
enforcement. The following principles are some of the key build-
ing blocks for this approach to antitrust to which many 
scholars-as previously defined-subscribe in varying degrees. 
a. Industry concentration may not matter at all. Large firms are 
probably large because they are efficient and there may be no 
relationship whatsoever between industry structure and perform-
ance. If there is a relationship, it is complex and variable, not 
subject to simple correlations. 
b. Entry into many markets is relatively easy and many markets are 
contestable. Either new entry or the threat of new entry makes 
existing market power much less of a problem than traditionally 
perceived. 
c. The world is changing faster than ever. Technological change in 
many industries is so rapid we can't even describe it adequately. 
Even an illicit monopoly in a rapidly changing industry is little 
3 Whether these views are "new" or simply extensions of tradi-
tional economic principles is an interesting but largely irrelevant debate. 
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cause for antitrust concern because the monopoly will disappear 
before enforcement action could be effective. 
d. Even if it could move fast enough, the government is demon-
strably not wise enough to intervene in markets in a manner likely 
to solve more problems than it creates. 
e. Capital markets are relatively efficient and know (or learn quickly) 
just about everything worth knowing. Thus, since market power is 
often derived from, or supported by, imperfect information and 
thus limited access to capital, there is less cause for antitrust 
concern than historically believed. 
f. More and more industries function in international markets today. 
If a domestic cartel attempts supracompetitive pricing, there will 
often be a quick foreign response. While the domestic industry 
may occasionally be successful in creating barriers to foreign 
competition, these barriers are generally ineffective. Steel is the 
commonly used example. 
If you put all these principles together, and if you were to 
accept them completely and uncritically, there would hardly be 
any need for antitrust as we have traditionally known it.4 The 
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines would be unnecessary, 
since they continue to rest on the notion that market concentra-
tion is important and predictive. Nor would you consider vertical 
restraints guidelines. Even the current enforcement priority-car-
tels-would become largely irrelevant, since cartels would be 
believed likely to dissolve before the government could find and 
successfully prosecute them. Only efforts to remove governmen-
tal restraints would be sensible. 
But not everyone accepts this new religion; indeed, some in 
positions of influence violently oppose it. And so, almost like 
Scrooge and his bothersome ghosts, we continue to see, on a 
regular basis, examples of the old-time antitrust religion: 
a. The Sixth Circuit reverses a summary judgment per curiam, 
holding that a driver who bought a tractor-trailer from a trucking 
company was entitled to a trial on his allegation that the trucking 
4 For an articulation of something close to this position, see Fred 
L. Smith, Jr., Why Not Abolish Antitrust?, REGULATION, Jan.lFeb. 
1983, at 23. 
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company illegally tied the financing of the truck to the driver's 
acceptance of an offer of employment. While the trucking com-
pany obviously lacked power in the relevant market (the financing 
of tractor-trailer trucks), said the court, "it is clear that, as a 
matter of law, sub market analysis, if not a substitute for the 
standard market test, is a factor to be considered in defining the 
relevant market." The driver contended that there was a sub-
market consisting of the trucking company and its owner-opera-
tors; the Sixth Circuit found this allegation sufficient to avoid 
summary judgmenU 
b. The Eighth Circuit reverses a dismissal of a claim that subdivision 
lots were illegally tied to golf club memberships. The district court 
dismissed the case because lot purchasers were not required to buy 
club memberships. But, said the Eighth Circuit, a complaint 
"should not be dismissed merely because a plaintiff's allegations 
do not support the particular legal theory he advances. . . ."6 
c. A trucking company that entered the garments-on-hangers market 
between Pennsylvania and New York City is found liable for more 
than $39 million in trebled damages in a suit brought by a 
competitor charging attempted monopolization. Since there were a 
"limited number of competitors" and since, within three months 
of entering the market, the defendant had "procured seven of 
plaintiff's customers," the jury found (and the district court 
denied a motion for judgment n.o.v.) that there was a dangerous 
probability of monopolization.7 
d. A district court rules that the acquisition of Kitchen Aid by 
Whirlpool violated section 7, notwithstanding approval of the 
transaction by the Federal Trade Commission. The court 
"stress[ed] that it is not bound in any way by the determination 
made by the" FTC.8 
5 Hand v. Central Transport, Inc., 779 F.2d 8, 11 (6th Cir. 1985) 
(per curiam). 
6 Terre Du Lac Ass'n, Inc. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 772 F.2d 467 (8th 
Cir. 1985). 
7 International Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 
1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) , 66,665, at 63,118 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1985). 
8 White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 1985-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) , 66,699 at 63,313 n.1 (N.D. Ohio July 3, 1985), 
vacated, 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) '66,797 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 1985) 
(defendants modified their contract and the court vacated the prelimi-
nary injunction; its statements about the FTC were not discussed). 
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e. The Supreme Court refuses to hear an appeal from the Ninth 
Circuit ruling that Data General Corp. violated the antitrust laws 
by selling its computer software only to purchasers of its com-
puters. The relevant market, said the court of appeals, was 
purchasers of Data General computers.9 
f. The Supreme Court also refuses to review a Ninth Circuit ruling 
that proof of per se violations of section 1 can sustain an 
attempted monopolization finding, regardless of the probability 
that the conduct will lead to the monopolization of a relevant 
market. 10 
g. The Supreme Court holds that a refusal by the owner of three 
mountains in Aspen to sell a multiarea ticket in conjunction with 
the other ski mountain in Aspen was illegal monopolization. The 
relevant market was destination skiing in Aspen,,1 
h. A competitor is granted an injunction preventing a merger because 
of the possibility that the resulting entity could conceivably gain 
market share by an illegal cost-price squeeze. The competitor had 
standing, said the court, because of other two groups affected-
suppliers and consumers-would benefit (at least in the short run) 
from the merger and thus would be unlikely to seek to block it. 12 
i. The National Association of Attorneys General produces its ver-
sion of antitrust guidelines for vertical restraints,13 and the House 
of Respresentatives passes a nonbinding resolution condemning 
the DOJ Vertical Guidelines. 14 Both represent a wholesale rejection 
9 Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985). 
10 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Blanton, 105 S. Ct. 2369 (1985). 
II Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 S. Ct. 
2847 (1985). 
12 Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570 (10th 
Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.w. 1108 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1986) (No. 
85-473). 
13 NAAG's Vertical Restraints Guidelines, [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & 
TRADE REG. RER (BNA) No. 1243, at 996 (Dec. 5, 1985). 
14 Resale Price Maintenance Portion oj House Judiciary Commit-
tee's Report on H.R. 2348 to Authorize Appropriations jor Justice 
Department jor Fiscal 1986, [Jan-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 
(BNA) No. 1219, at 1025 (June 13, 1985). 
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of the "new" economic analysis as the touchstone of antitrust 
enforcement. 
We could go on, but you get the picture. The antitrust world 
today is not as simple as some would make it seem. These 
examples illustrate the dramatic dichotomy between the rhetoric 
of the scholars (as defined earlier) and the not infrequent judicial 
and other decisions that completely ignore both that rhetoric and 
the analytical approach that supports it. Of course, there are also 
a large (and growing) number of decisions that are perfectly 
consistent with the scholarly rhetoric. As a result, the one word 
that most accurately describes antitrust today is "unstable." 
Antitrust in the future 
Where do we go from here? One possible scenario is the 
logical conclusion of our 20-year economic romance: we don't 
need antitrust, or worse, antitrust enforcement is positively harm-
ful. In either case, let's get rid of it. The federal enforcement 
budgets have steadily shrunk in the last half decade; a continua-
tion of this trend would be consistent with this scenario. We may 
even see legislative initiatives that are consistent with this possibil-
ity; the administration is proposing legislation to refocus the 
Clayton Act (and there continues to be some support for outright 
repeal of section 7). The internationalists provide another impe-
tus for change in this same direction. Indeed, the administration's 
legislation includes antitrust relief for "declining" industries. 
Both the scholars and the internationalists are strong forces 
pushing toward the end of traditional populist antitrust enforce-
ment. 
Despite their best efforts, however, these groups do not yet 
control Congress, and broad legislative initiatives are not likely to 
be successful absent some significant economic or political 
changes. Of course, the politicians can't legislate their view of the 
world either, and so are reduced to passing nonbinding resolu-
tions and inserting language in appropriations bills that tries to 
prevent proselytizing by the Antitrust Division. Thus, we seem to 
have a stalemate on the legislative front, to go along with the 
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instability evident in the judiciary. All in all, an unsatisfying 
situation for everyone concerned, including the business commu-
nity, which above all else abhors uncertainty. 
This stalemate means that we will not see the end of tradi-
tional (which is to say, populist) antitrust anytime soon. Antitrust 
is, after all, still mom and apple pie, as well as a convenient 
excuse for failure and a handy weapon for revenge. Marketplace 
injuries will continue to prompt a search for relief, and antitrust 
remains enough of a possible source of compensation that it 
seems unlikely to fade away entirely. We may see new and 
different forms of attack-state antitrust or unfair competition 
statutes, the use of state tort law (interference with business 
relationships, etc.), state franchise and similar statutes, or even 
the U.C.C. (Uniform Commercial Code)-and RICO (Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) will continue to 
attract venture capital until amended. But where there is business 
pain, there will continue to be antitrust screams, and until (and if) 
the scholars completely capture the judiciary or gain working 
control of the Congress, those screams will continue to be heard. 
But if the end of antitrust is not near, what is the future? 
While our crystal ball is hazy, the fact that there has been a 
growing gap between antitrust theory and populist politics-with 
the resulting destruction of the theoretical-political consensus 
that fueled antitrust's golden age-must have a dramatic effect. 
The notion that increased concentration will lead to increased 
profitability and poorer competitive performance was a more 
powerful one because it was consistent with a visceral public 
concern over agglomerations of private economic power. But new 
economic insights have been accompanied by a growing willing-
ness to look beyond simple market structure to the inevitably 
more complicated actual performance of markets. This has meant 
the end of simple but arbitrary legal rules, and a general reduc-
tion of previous prohibitions on a variety of forms of business 
conduct that may have procompetitive effects. 
Whether economics is the cause of, or merely a convenient 
excuse for this change is unclear. Other forces, including most 
importantly the growing internationalization of markets, have 
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also been critically important. Nonetheless, economic analysis 
has at least been the tool of change, and even if it does not 
become dominant, it promises to remain important in the transi-
tion years to follow. The inevitable result will be complex rules 
and proceedings, ambiguity, and the absence of enforcement 
principles that can be translated into simple political principles-
or slogans. Remember "Big is bad"? No comparable flag for 
current enforcement leaps to mind. This has to lessen political 
support for antitrust, and that has to have an impact on the shape 
of antitrust in the future. Still, given the critical role to be played 
by world economic conditions, the variables are just too complex 
to make prediction a worthwhile enterprise. 
The best we can do is suggest that we are most likely in for a 
very lengthy period of transition, perhaps not ending before the 
next century. We don't think traditional antitrust will disappear, 
but the exact characteristics of the antitrust that will emerge are 
impossible to predict. 
Antitrust tomorrow 
Shorter-term predictions are slightly less foolish. If this ad-
ministration is succeeded by another like it, you can reasonably 
expect more of the same. The antitrust initiatives of a new 
Republican administration would probably be influenced more 
by general economic circumstances than by any other single 
factor. 
Should the White House change hands in 1988, by contrast, 
some modest changes could be expected. These changes would, of 
course, depend critically on who was elected and on the national 
and international economic circumstances faced during his or her 
term. The enforcement philosophy and approach of future heads 
of the antitrust agencies might have some minor impact. But even 
if a Democrat is elected president in 1988, and even if the 
Democrats control both houses of Congress following that elec-
tion, it is hard to visualize a dramatic short-term swing from the 
current situation. This is true for several reasons. 
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First, the scholars will still control the policy issues, and even 
the politicians recognize the power of the economic logic. No 
responsible antitrust agency head-of either party-would ever 
return to many of the antitrust initiatives of the 1960s or 1970s. 
Second, the federal judiciary is becoming increasingly conser-
vative. By the time President Reagan leaves office, he will have 
appointed approximately half of the then-sitting federal judges. 
These judges are likely to be especially receptive to the new 
antitrust learning. Even the Supreme Court seems on the verge of 
a close embrace of much of the new philosophy (see, for example, 
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Hyde IS), although deci-
sions like Maricopa l6 and Aspen Skiing leave one to wonder 
whether there really is a common thread there after all. Even if 
Mike Pertschuk showed up back in charge of the FTC, with 
Sandy Litvack at Justice, the courts would probably prevent them 
from moving antitrust sharply away from its present course. 
Given the moderating influence of the judiciary in the late 
seventies and early eighties, it seems reasonable to expect that 
after 1988 the more conservative judiciary would operate as even 
more of a constraint on any "misguided" enforcement initiatives 
that might arise. 
This does not mean, of course, that it would necessarily make 
no difference in antitrust enforcement if the Democrats were 
elected in 1988 (or 1992). Those who see antitrust as an affirma-
tive instrument for economic justice, however defined, would no 
doubt seek to come up with "responsible" antitrust initiatives 
that integrated the new antitrust learning into positive enforce-
ment programs, yet did so in a way that avoided the old failures. 
This could conceivably affect both the length of the current 
transition and the final structure of the antitrust of the twenty-
first century. 
A relatively easy approach would be to simply tighten stan-
dards in a number of conventional areas. This would result from 
15 Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
16 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 
(1982). 
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taking all of the "new economics" outlined earlier less seriously 
than many do today. A new generation of antitrusters could 
believe that concentration probably matters, that entry is often 
difficult and lengthy, that technological change is not always so 
great that it would prevent or cure monopolies, that many 
markets are not world markets, and that cartels do not self-
destruct quickly enough. 
These differences in degree of belief on these issues could 
mean, for example, somewhat tighter market definitions and 
relatively lower market share threshold levels in merger enforce-
ment. This could have significant effects in the short run. Most 
merger enforcement tends to be on the margin. Since the antitrust 
community has now adjusted to the current merger enforcement 
standards, even a small downward shift of the margin between 
permissible and challenged mergers could produce a significant 
number of cases, at least at first. After the antitrust community 
figured out where the new equilibrium was, of course, we would 
expect firms and their lawyers to adjust to this new situation. But 
the post-1988 standards could be somewhat tighter than the 
current ones without truly significant defections from an 
economic standard of the sort being applied today. 
It is this very possibility, of course, that provides the impetus 
for the current legislative initiatives aimed at rewriting the merger 
enforcement statute. It is because it is so easy to influence merger 
policy at the margin that, for those who view merger enforcement 
as an important factor in economic performance, a tightening of 
the statutory standard is such a high priority. 
There are some other, more controversial possibilities for 
short-term change. A number of new and not so new ideas could 
alter the antitrust balance, sometimes by reinjecting more popu-
list notions into antitrust analysis. 
A first possibility is the "raising rivals' costs" idea.17 This 
approach reasons that if a firm wishes to disadvantage a rival, 
17 This theory is primarily being developed by Steve Salop and 
others. See Salop & Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. 
REV. 267 (1983); Salop, Scheffman & Schwartz, A Bidding Analysis of 
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instead of doing such things as pricing predatorily low, the firm 
can instead (or in addition) attempt to raise its rivals' costs. Such 
techniques can disadvantage a competitor without unduly harm-
ing the firm employing the practice. For example, suppose that a 
large firm with market power which uses relatively little labor 
conspires with its unions to dramatically increase wage rates 
throughout the industry. If the unions succeed in obtaining the 
same increase from industry firms which use relatively large 
amounts of labor, the wage increase will have the net effect of 
disadvantaging the first firm's competitors by raising their (rela-
tive) costs"s 
Of course, it is difficult to predict how this concept would or 
could be applied, and whether it would prove useful. I9 There has 
already been an effort by the FTC to explicitly utilize this concept 
in the U-Haul case,2O albeit in circumstances where the govern-
ment was involved, and Acting Chairman Calvani has aggres-
sively advanced the concept. But it may in practice be very 
difficult to distinguish honest industrial conduct from predatory 
Special Interest Regulation: Raising Rivals' Costs in a Rent Seeking 
Society (FTC Bureau of Compo Working Paper No. 114, Sept. 1984). 
See also Calvani, Non-Price Predation: A New Antitrust Horizon, 54 
ANTITRUST L.J. 409 (1985). Like virtually all economic theories, how-
ever, it has antecedents. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 156-59 
(1978); Marvel, Factory Regulation: A Reexamination of Early English 
Experience, 20 J. LAW & EeoN. 379 (1977); Williamson, Wage Rates as a 
Barrier to Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspective, 82 Q.J. EeoN. 85 
(1968). 
18 This scenario assumes effective import restraints. For a more 
detailed discussion, see Lande & Zerbe, Reducing Unions' Monopoly 
Power: Costs and Benefits, 28 J. LAW & EeoN. 297, 305 (1985). 
19 The idea of raising rivals' costs could also be applied to vertical 
restraints. See Krattenmaker & Salop, Antitrust Analysis of Anticom-
petitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price 
(draft, Nov. 1985) (unpublished manuscript). 
20 In re Amerco and U-Haul International, Inc., No. 9193 (FTC, 
filed June 24, 1985). Indeed, Salop and other proponents would argue 
that this is merely a synthesis of the reasoning underlying a number of 
earlier antitrust decisions and currently pending cases. 
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conduct that raises rivals' costs. In the labor example given 
above, for example, it may be very difficult to determine whether 
a firm agreed to an unusually high labor rate as part of a scheme 
to disadvantage its rivals, or because the union forced it to do so. 
The one complaint filed so far leaves much to be desired in 
clarity; other investigations have fizzled. A new administration 
might be less finicky about the use of this theory, but it is not at 
all clear how important an additional weapon this could be. 
Another approach to antitrust would follow from a rein-
terpretation of the overall goals of the antitrust laws. The current 
orthodoxy is that the sole goal of antitrust is economic efficiency. 
Some scholars believe this uncritically.21 Neither the courts nor the 
enforcement agencies, however, have (yet) accepted this com-
pletely. While the old "big is bad, small is good" view of antitrust 
has been soundly rejected, a new enforcement regime could give 
more weight to popUlist or consumerist principles by adopting a 
"price" or "wealth transfer" approach to antitrust enforcement. 22 
Although the price approach differs from the efficiency approach 
as a practical matter only at the margin, the theoretical dif-
ferences can be illustrated by considering two examples of what 
antitrust enforcement would be like if the economic efficiency 
notion were ever totally accepted and taken to its logical extreme. 
Consider first the hypothetical of an insulin cartel. 23 Suppose 
that the cartel doubled the price of insulin but "that every insulin 
21 See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 17, at 66; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST 
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 23,99-100 (1976); Baxter, Separation of 
Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the tcCommon Law" Nature of 
Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661 (1982); Calvani, Consumer Welfare 
Is Prime Objective of Antitrust, Legal Times, Dec. 24, 1984, at 14. 
22 See Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Con-
cern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HAST-
INGS L.J. 65 (1982). 
23 Although this hypothetical might be somewhat extreme, there are 
many products, particularly products with industrial uses, whose de-
mand is very inelastic, at least in the short term. 
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consumer still purchased the drug. 24 This cartel would cause no 
economic inefficiency, since output would not fall,25 yet would 
transfer a significant amount of wealth from insulin consumers to 
cartel members. Under a pure efficiency approach, we would not 
challenge this cartel since efficiency would be unaffected.26 Under 
a price or wealth transfer approach, the cartel would nonetheless 
be challenged since it raised prices to consumers and "unfairly" 
transferred some of their wealth to the cartel members. 
To further contrast these approaches, consider a horizontal 
merger leading to a monopoly. Under a pure efficiency model, 
even if the merger would result in significantly higher prices to 
consumers for a significant period, it would nevertheless be 
permitted if it were likely to lead to productive efficiencies that 
would offset the inefficiency created by higher prices.27 By con-
trast, a price or wealth transfer standard would make it more 
likely that the merger would be challenged, on the ground that it 
was likely to result in significantly higher prices for consumers.28 
24 Also assume that new entry into the industry took 10 years, that 
no patents were involved, and that government regulation forbade 
imports. 
25 This ignores deterrence effects from attacking a publicly known 
cartel, and also the other advantages of having a per se rule against 
cartels. It also assumes that the cartel members engage in no rent-seek-
ing behavior. We also assume no efficiencies from the cartel, although 
they too are possible. 
26 Since we assume that the cartel would cause no inefficiency, we 
would not expend resources to challenge it. We could, of course, 
postulate advertising or distribution economies from the cartel to make 
it even more certain that the cartel would not be challenged under an 
efficiency approach. 
27 See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Trade-offs, 58 AM. EeoN. REV. 18 (1968); Muris, The Efficiency Defense 
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381 (1980). 
28 Nolan Clark reaches the same result on the grounds that such a 
merger would reduce output. See Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: 
The Return to the Cartelization Standard, 38 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1125 
(1985). 
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A price or wealth transfer approach would not permit mergers to 
"efficient monopolists" if it was thought that the monopolists 
would raise prices to consumers.29 
Of course, we think it is unlikely that any enforcement agency 
or court would today permit a cartel, or a merger to monopoly, 
that it believed would actually result in higher prices to con-
sumers. The efficiency model has not completely triumphed. 
Such a conclusion would, however, be the logical result of the 
efficiency approach to antitrust enforcement carried to an ex-
treme. It is conceivable that a new Bill Baxter could explicitly 
adopt and defend this approach after a decade of less candid 
application of an efficiency standard, but we cannot today say 
this is likely. Higher prices to consumers would be difficult public 
policy to explain, no matter how the scholars balanced their 
triangles and rectangles. But there certainly is a theoretical 
difference, and an emphasis away from efficiency and more 
toward a price or wealth transfer approach to antitrust enforce-
ment could make a difference on the margin.30 
29 See Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger En-
forcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580 (1983). 
30 Another illustration of the difference a wealth transfer approach 
could make might come in the tying area. Suppose tying is being used to 
price discriminate among customers. Suppose purchasers consume two 
products-the classic example is computers and computer cards-in 
variable proportions. If a computer monopolist were to tie the sale of 
computers to the sale of computer cards, it could extract additional 
revenue from consumers of computer services. Under an efficiency 
approach, this tying would be desirable since it would increase output 
and economic efficiency. 
By contrast, under a wealth transfer standard, tying might not be 
permitted since it would "unfairly" transfer wealth from consumers to 
the firm or firms imposing the tie. (Of course, whether such tying 
should be prohibited could depend upon how this market power was 
achieved. Tying that was a result of single-firm market power could be 
justified as a reward to innovation, whereas tying as a result of mergers 
or a cartel would be more suspect.) 
Interestingly, if you contrast the majority and minority opinions in 
Hyde, it is possible to explain their differences along such lines. The 
concurrence by Justice O'Connor seems to evaluate tying solely in 
efficiency terms, extensively cites Chicago school literature, and could 
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"Rent-seeking" behavior could also give rise to enforcement 
possibilities. Rent-seeking emphasizes that firms will often go to 
great lengths to obtain monopoly power (or other types of 
economic rent) and that this behavior often wastes society's 
resources. A growing body of literature suggests that rent-seeking 
might be an important and widespread phenomenon.31 
For example, reconsider the merger to monopoly example 
discussed above. Under a pure economic efficiency approach 
which did not factor in rent-seeking, the merger might be al-
lowed. If, however, rent-seeking behavior was thought likely, it 
would be more likely that the merger would be challenged to 
avoid what would otherwise be monopoly profit-a "neutral" 
transfer from consumers to the monopoly31-from being dissi-
pated as inefficient rent-seeking behavior. 33 Since rent-seeking 
would cause us to weigh the harms from market power more 
heavily, a belief that rent-seeking was common could make it 
more likely that mergers and other practices that could give rise 
to market power would be challenged.34 
not find much, if anything, wrong with tying. Although the majority 
opinion was not explicit, it could be read as containing a suspicion of 
tying arrangements, since they might be used to force consumers to pay 
more for their goods. See Sims, "Monsanto," "Hyde" Rulings Put 
Baxter Slightly Ahead, Legal Times, Apr. 16, 1984, at 14. 
31 See, e.g., Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). See also Tullock, Peltzman, Posner, 
Maloney, McCormick & Tollison, and other sources cited in Salop, 
Scheffman & Schwartz, supra note 17. 
32 As noted earlier, one could also conclude that the transfer was 
not neutral. 
33 Interestingly, the implementation of rent-seeking theories within 
an efficiency framework could lead to antitrust enforcement similar to 
that which could arise from the use of a wealth transfer or price 
standard, since both accentuate the harm from market power. 
34 Many vertical restraints could also be explained by rent-seeking 
behavior. Firms might impose vertical restraint on their distributors, for 
example, in an attempt to extract their rents. 
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As an even more unconventional example, it might be possible 
for a new administration to reexamine and partially rehabilitate 
the most thoroughly discredited of all the antitrust statutes-the 
one statute which virtually all observers agree is totally useless 
and harmful-the Robinson-Patman Act. This law has been 
criticized on an unending number of grounds, but the main 
criticisms have a common theme:3s Robinson-Patman Act en-
forcement, by prohibiting price discriminations in favor of large 
customers, results in economic inefficiency and higher prices for 
consumers.36 
Some might argue, however, that it may not be impossible to 
bring intelligent Robinson-Patman Act cases if the rent-seeking 
concept is accepted as a justification for enforcement. For exam-
ple, the act could be used to prevent retailers' rents from being 
acquired by manufacturers (or other sellers) with market power. 
In this respect, its purpose could be thought of as parallel to the 
above-described approach to the other antitrust laws which sug-
gests their concern with preventing certain transfers of wealth 
from consumers to firms with market power. Whether this is a 
realistic vision is open to argument. 
This by no means exhausts potential theories that could be 
explored if a new administration decided (for whatever reason) to 
increase its antitrust enforcement profile.37 For example, a recent 
study incorporating imperfect information into predation anal-
ysis suggests that enforcement against predatory pricing should 
be rare, but probably not as rare as many members of the 
Chicago school suggest.38 Recent work in the vertical restraints 
35 See H. HOVENKAMp, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 
338-54 (1985), and the sources cited therein. 
36 There are many other problems with the act, of course, such as 
the difficulty in applying the cost justification defense. 
37 See generally, Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New 
Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981). 
38 See Zerbe & Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison 
of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655 (1982); compare 
with R. BORK, supra note 17, at 144-60; Easterbrook, Predatory Strate-
gies and Counter strategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981). 
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area (focusing on inframarginal consumers, as distinct from the 
conventional focus on marginal consumers) argues that vertical 
restraints may be more likely to harm economic efficiency than is 
often believed.39 A recent article on tying suggests how imperfect 
information can lead to tying which harms consumer welfare. 4O A 
recent article on market definition suggests an approach which 
could lead to stricter merger enforcement.41 A recent analysis of 
leveraging raises questions with the prevailing views on the issue.42 
Any or all of these theories or suggestions could be persuasive to 
a new administration, and the list will surely increase during the 
next two years. 
It is difficult to predict whether any of these theories or 
approaches would actually prove to be important or even useful, 
or whether any future antitrust enforcers, or private plaintiffs, 
would actually embrace them. It is certainly possible that new 
administrations of either party could continue the current en-
forcement philosophy, or perhaps even reach further toward the 
logical implications of today's dominant economic analytical 
framework. Merger enforcement may become less aggressive 
rather than more aggressive; vertical restraints law may be legisla-
tively or judicially loosened further; international competition 
may result in less concern over domestic competition. Many of 
the ideas outlined above have severe theoretical or practical 
problems and, especially if used indiscriminately, could con-
39 See Comanor & Kirkwood, Resale Price Maintenance and Anti-
trust Policy, 3 CONTEMPORARY POLICY ISSUES 9 (1985); Comanor, Vertical 
Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Pol-
icy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985); Scherer, The Economics of Vertical 
Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687 (1983). 
40 See Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The 
Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U.L. REV. 661 (1982) (cited by the 
Supreme Court in Hyde). 
41 See Harris & Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated 
Approach, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
42 See Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 
85 COLUMBIA L. REV. 515 (1985). 
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ceivably spark an even more determined movement away from 
antitrust as an economic civil rights policy. 
All of these possibilities exist, and the only guide to the future 
that seems at all reliable to us is the belief that American political 
opinion still values traditional antitrust principles highly. Anti-
trust is an American invention, one that people are still proud of, 
and we are not yet convinced that its traditional, populist articu-
lations are about to be finally discarded. 
Wallowing in the bog 
So, the lOOth anniversary of the Sherman Act promises to 
find us still wallowing in the bog of transition or stalemate. The 
state of play at the 1 lOth anniversary, however, is much harder to 
predict. The one certainty is that there will always be the little 
guys and the big guys, the wealthy and the poor, the powerful and 
the weak, and there will always be politicians who attempt to 
exploit these facts of life and judges influenced by them. Some 
will listen to the scholars, and some will merely use them, but we 
think it is much too early to conclude that the scholars will ever 
gain full control over the American antitrust agenda. Antitrust is 
aging, but it's not dying yet. 
